Author: Obaidullah Nimruzi
The Guardian of Al-Andalus (Spain): Sultan Yusuf ibn Tashfin [MABH] (Part 39)
The Solidarity Pact of the Andalusian Emirs
Yusuf agreed with the Andalusian Emirs that each would prepare his army and supplies and join them at a specific time and place. Mu’tamid ibn ‘Ibbad, the Emir of Seville, tried his best to get close to Yusuf and provided him with abundant supplies. Yusuf stayed in Seville for eight days to organize his forces and await the arrival of the other Emirs of Andalusia. During this time, he fasted during the days, spent his nights in prayer and reciting the Quran, and fascinated the hearts of the people and the army with charity and justice.
Organizing the Army and Moving Towards Battle
Yusuf then set out from Seville with his army and passed through the lands of Emir Batlious. His army was organized as follows:
Front of the army: ten thousand Almoravid cavalry under the command of Abu Suleiman Dawud ibn Ayesha.
Andalusian army: under the command of Mu’tamid ibn ‘Ibbad, who moved separately from the Almoravids.
The main Almoravid army: Led by Yusuf ibn Tashfin, who moved one day after the Andalusian army.
The army stopped for three days after reaching the vicinity of Batlious.
The preparation of the Crusaders and their movement towards the Muslim army
The greed of Alfonso VI and the violation of treaties
Alfonso VI, the king of Castile and León, became greedy for Islamic Andalusia, his pride and rebellion increased, and he violated his treaties with the princes and kings of the tribes. A flood of crusader knights from all over Europe – with religious and booty motives – flowed towards him with the support and blessing of the Pope. They caused corruption and destruction in Islamic Andalusia until they reached the shores of the Green Island. As mentioned earlier, Alfonso arrogantly declared his challenge and direct threat to the Muslim emir, Yusuf ibn Tashfin. [1]
Siege of Zaragoza and tactical retreat
Alfonso first went to Zaragoza to fight its emir, Ibn Hood. He besieged the city and pressed it hard, but the defenders held out bravely. When news reached him that the Muslim army had crossed from Morocco to Andalusia, he abandoned the siege and decided to postpone the capture of Zaragoza.
Extensive mobilization of the Crusader forces
He called his forces from the regions of Galicia, León, Basque Country, Asturias and Castile and wrote to Sanche Ramírez, King of Aragon and Lord of Benibel, who was besieging Tartuse. Sanche joined him with his army. He also corresponded with Count Raymond of Berengaria, who was planning to attack Valencia, and he also came with his forces.
Alfonso also sought help from the princes and counts beyond the Pyrenees, and soon a flood of knights and volunteers from France, Germany, England, and Italy joined him. His army outnumbered the Muslims in both numbers and equipment and took on the appearance of a full-scale crusade. Priests, monks, and bishops raised crosses, opened gospels to the army, the popes blessed and encouraged them, and even their monks made a pact to die in battle. [2]
Alfonso’s Pride and Self-Glory
Alfonso was so intoxicated with pride in the number and strength of his army that he said, “I will fight jinn, men, and angels of heaven by this army.” And elsewhere he boasted, “I will meet the God of Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) with this army!” [3]
Approaching the battlefield
Alfonso decided to take the initiative and bring the war to Muslim territory before they had a chance to advance. While the Muslims had already chosen the battlefield, he advanced to a distance of 18 miles from the Muslim army and camped there.
The first trick of Muslim
At this time, the Emir of Seville, Al-Mu’tamid ibn Ibbad, ordered Yusuf ibn Tashfin to go to a mountain slope in front of Alfonso so that the Muslim ranks would be in sight of the enemy. Alfonso thought that this was the entire Muslim force he saw, and thus the first plan of the Emir of the Muslims was successfully implemented.
Arrangement of the Crusader Army
Alfonso divided his army into two large parts:
The first part was commanded by Count Garcia and Count Roderick, who were tasked with attacking Alfonso’s position.
The second part was the flanks of Alfonso’s army, commanded by Sanche Ramirez, King of Aragon, and Count Raymond.
Alfonso himself took command of the heart of the army. Thus, his precautions and measures were as calculated as those of Yusuf ibn Tashfin. Finally, the two armies formed up, separated only by a small branch of the Wadi al-Yana’a river – a branch called Wadi Ibra. [4]
Research in the book Al-Zalaqah, the Battle of the Islamic Wars, writes about the statistics of both sides; the Islamic and Crusader forces against each other:
Number of the army of Islam: The number of the regular Islamic army was more than twenty thousand, not counting the volunteers for jihad who came from all over Andalusia, and their number was also considerable. [5]
Number of the Crusader army: Reports differ regarding the number of Alfonso’s army: The Alfonso narration says: “The chosen army consisted of forty thousand armored warriors, each with followers and companions, and even the Christians of that time considered this number low and believed that their number was much higher.” [6]
The most authentic narration states: “The Crusader army consisted of eighty thousand cavalry and two hundred thousand infantries.” [7]
The numerical superiority of the Crusaders
What is certain is that the number of both armies was very large, but all sources agree that the Muslim army was much smaller in numbers than the Crusader army, and it is possible that their number was only half of the enemy forces. [8]
Camps on the Plain of Zalaqah
The two armies camped near Batlious in a plain full of bushes and grassland. Arab sources call it “al-Zalaqah” or “al-Sahlah” and Christian sources call it “Sacrelias”. There was a small river between the two armies, which in Arab sources is known as “Nahr al-Hajir” or “Nahr al-Batlious”.
Yusuf stationed the Almoravid army behind a high hill and placed the Andalusians facing the Christians. The vast number of Christians was so great that the sight of them weakened the morale of the Andalusian princes and put fear in their hearts of defeat.
On the other hand, the supply of provisions for the two armies was small and they could not stay there for long; therefore, a confrontation was inevitable and immediate. [9]
Continues…
References:
- Muhammad Abdullah Annan, History of Andalusia during the Almoravid and Almowahed Era, p. 80; Al-Hajji, Andalusian History, p. 405.
- Al-Maqri, Nafh al-Tayyib, vol. 4, p. 363; Al-Himyari, Al-Rawz al-Mua’tar, p. 87.
- Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh, vol. 8, p. 142.
- Ibid.
- Hasan Ibrahim Hasan, History of Islam, vol. 4, p. 121.
- Al-Maqri, Nafh al-Tayyib, vol. 4, p. 363.
- Ibn Abi Zarh al-Fasi, Al-Mu’nis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa al-Andalus wa al-Maghrib, p. 108.
- Al-Hajji, Andalusian History, p. 405.
- Ibn Azari, Al-Bayan Al-Maghrib, Vol. 3, p. 328; Al-Maqri, Nafh Al-Tayyib, Vol. 2, p. 326.
