Author: Sayyed Musleh Uddin
Diplomacy in Islam (part 7)
The Influence of Al-Andalus on Relations between Baghdad and France:
During this era, our knowledge of Al-Andalus reveals that with the emergence of Abd al-Rahman I of the Umayyads in Spain, the flames of internal wars that had plunged the region into chaos gradually subsided. With strong resolve and wise political strategies, Abd al-Rahman succeeded in establishing a new Umayyad state in Córdoba. Meanwhile, the Abbasid Caliphate, which had not yet firmly rooted itself on the ruins of the Umayyad state in the Levant, looked at the rise of this revolutionary Umayyad regime with concern and suspicion, fearing it might challenge their supremacy in the West. Thus, the early Abbasid caliphs considered neutralizing the Andalusian state, and Caliph al-Mansur sent the ruler of Ifriqiya to confront Al-Andalus. However, he was ultimately defeated and killed by Abd al-Rahman. This victory deeply unsettled al-Mansur.
Moreover, the emergence of the Umayyad state in Al-Andalus posed a threat not only to the Abbasids but also to France. The memory of Islamic wars against France and the significant battles fought along the Loire River were still vivid in the minds of the Frankish tribes. There was a growing concern that with the resolution of internal conflicts in Al-Andalus, the Islamic state might once again unify and become a powerful force. Such a prospect could rekindle hostility and rivalry between France and the nascent Cordoban state—especially between Christianity, whose banner of triumph was raised by Charlemagne, and Islam, which had steadily expanded towards France in the past half-century. Charlemagne sought to seize every opportunity to continue the policies of his grandfather, Charles Martel. The ongoing civil wars in Spain presented such an opportunity.
Abd al-Rahman I was able to defeat his enemies in the south, but the north was still embroiled in rebellious uprisings. The most powerful among these rebels was Sulaiman ibn Yaqzan al-Kalbi, the governor of Barcelona. Along with several fellow rebels—such as Husayn ibn Yahya al-Ansari, governor of Zaragoza, and the descendants of Yusuf al-Fihri, the last rulers of Al-Andalus before ʿAbd al-Rahman—they sought assistance from Charlemagne. They eventually met him in Paderborn, in northern Italy, and persuaded him to launch a campaign to capture northern Spanish territories, pledging to surrender Zaragoza and other cities to him.
This invitation came at a convenient time, as Charlemagne had just completed the suppression of the pagan Saxon tribes. As a result, he assembled a large army and crossed the Pyrenees.
In Charlemagne’s political agenda, attention to Islamic Al-Andalus was considered a vital component and a key principle of France’s broader policy at the time. Nevertheless, his friendship with the Abbasid Caliph Haroon Al- Rashid did not exempt him from this approach. The Church played a notable role in shaping this policy, as the expansion of Islam in Spain and its proximity to France were seen by the Church as a significant threat to Christianity. Charlemagne had allied himself with the Church and used its influence to consolidate his power and military victories, while the Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East ruled over millions of Christians.
The victories of the Church may have prompted Charlemagne to seek increased tolerance from Haroon Al- Rashid toward Christians, including respect for the Holy Sepulchre and Christian pilgrims. This might have been one of the reasons behind the Abbasid Caliphate’s efforts to establish friendly relations with the King of France and the Roman Emperor.
The relationship between Charlemagne and Haroon Al- Rashid has drawn the attention of French historians and scholars. Some, like the renowned orientalist Reinaud, have affirmed this relationship, while others, such as Russian orientalists Barthold and Fazilov, have rejected it. In his book Ostens Chtistlichen, Barthold examines this topic and questions the motivations behind such relations and the accuracy of the French historical accounts.
Barthold considers it possible that there were connections between Charlemagne and the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and that emissaries may have been exchanged between them—especially for religious and commercial matters that would necessitate such interactions. However, he emphasizes that this does not necessarily imply the existence of formal diplomatic missions between Harun and Charlemagne.
As for the tale of the elephant being sent from the East to Charlemagne’s court—assuming it to be true—it is not sufficient proof that it was sent by the Caliph or that it had any political motivation. While the exchange of embassies between Harun and Empress Irene of Constantinople is historically confirmed, there is no conclusive evidence that Harun knew anything about Charlemagne or his kingdom.
Fazilov agrees with Barthold in rejecting the credibility of these alleged diplomatic relations and embassies. He argues, “The best evidence is that Eastern sources make no mention of this subject whatsoever.”
We disagree with the views of Barthold and Fazilov and believe that the French historical accounts are accurate. These records were authored by prominent historians such as Einhard, Charlemagne’s own biographer, who lived during that era. The level of detail in recounting events and individuals reflects their alignment with historical realities. Furthermore, significant political interests existed at the time that would have aligned the policies of the Abbasid Caliphate and Charlemagne in light of the situation in Al-Andalus, as explained earlier.
The silence of Arabic sources regarding these relations may be due to the fact that such interactions and diplomatic missions were considered state secrets and, therefore, kept confidential. A tacit understanding between the Abbasid Caliph and a Christian king against the Islamic state in Spain would not have been a topic easily discussed or recorded.
Islamic historiography may have neglected to mention many significant events in the relations between Islam and Christianity—either due to lack of information or because they were deemed unimportant. Nonetheless, this should not be taken as evidence to deny the truth of those events.
Continues…

Previous Part

Leave A Reply

Exit mobile version