Author: Mufti Obaidullah Noorzahi
Crises of Liberalism in the Contemporary World (Part 14)
The Right to Freedom from the Perspective of the Qur’an and Liberalism
Freedom is a highly praised concept, and the pursuit of freedom and liberation from constraints and limitations is considered one of humanity’s most passionate aspirations. Topics such as the nature and definitions of freedom from both Western liberal and divine religious perspectives—particularly Islam—as well as the infiltration of the liberal perspective into Islamic societies and among superficial Muslim thinkers lacking deep religious understanding, are primary themes here.
The discussion of Islam and freedom, refuting the notion that religious teachings are incompatible with freedom, and identifying, limiting, and describing the dimensions of freedom in the Qur’an (which vary according to human relationships), are also among the subjects explored.
The pursuit of freedom and release from restrictions has always been a fervent human aspiration. As has been said: “Human history is a struggle for freedom.” And: “He who renounces freedom renounces humanity, divine rights, and even the responsibilities of mankind.”
But what truly is freedom? Is the experience of freedom the same for all people across cultures, or is it dependent on various political and social contexts? Is freedom simply the absence of external pressure, or does it also depend on the presence of something else? If it does depend on something existential, what is that? What psychological, social, or ideological factors drive human efforts toward freedom?
Such questions frame the meaning and scope of freedom. And without understanding freedom, one cannot truly possess it. Therefore, exploring the concept of freedom is essential for its seekers and analysts.
What Is Freedom?
Defining freedom and uncovering its precise meaning is both easy and difficult. The ambiguity and confusion around this concept arise from the breadth of its implications, and at times from incorrect interpretations and misapplications. Philosophers, jurists, mystics, politicians, theologians, materialists, economists, psychologists, and ethicists—all engage with and think about freedom in their respective ways.
Definitions of Freedom
Montesquieu (1689–1755) in The Spirit of the Laws writes: “No word has turned more heads than the word ‘freedom,’ and none has been assigned such varied meanings.” He then offers several examples:
• For some, freedom means having the power to remove someone from authority when they misuse it.
• For others, it means being able to choose the person they must obey.
• Another group defines it as the right to arm themselves and exert power.
• Some see it as enjoying certain privileges, such as being ruled by someone from their own nation or under their own specific laws.
• Some nations have even mistaken their traditions and rituals for freedom.
• Others define freedom by the type of regime they live under, believing their specific system embodies it.
Because these ideas were incomplete, Montesquieu offered his own definitions in two realms:
• Freedom in relation to the state: The right to do what the law permits and not be forced to do what it forbids.
• Freedom in relation to the people: Political freedom is the sense or belief in one’s security.
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), another prominent Western philosopher and advocate for freedom, stated: “Individual freedom is protection from certain forms of tyranny. Political freedom is complete security from injustice by those who govern.”
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) described the free person as one who only desires what is within their capability and does whatever they wish.
According to Friedrich Hayek, freedom is the opposite of slavery—being free from the will and imposition of others.
Some Muslim scholars define freedom in various ways: The most limited definition is “not being enslaved,” and the broadest is “not being trapped and being released from bondage.”
All of the above definitions—and other behaviorist interpretations—view freedom in the context of social and political life, emphasizing relationships between humans and governments or among individuals. One of their clearest shortcomings is their narrow scope: they fail to consider the other dimensions of human relationships—particularly man’s relationship with his inner potential, reality, and with God, the Creator.
Thus, some scholars offer a broader categorization:
• Negative freedom: Freedom from restrictions such as prison, foreign domination, tyrants, or physical chains. This also includes inner freedom from moral vices like greed, jealousy, and fear, and from desires and anger.
• Positive freedom: The capacity to express oneself, make decisions, invest, plan, and build. While this view of freedom adds value by including the individual’s relationship with self, it still fails to present a complete definition because it ignores the essential relationship between humans and Allah. As such, like earlier definitions, it remains rooted in materialist thought.
This deficiency stems from a modern conception of freedom, justice, equality, and human rights as secular and post-religious constructs—essentially products of liberalism, which is itself a philosophy of emancipation.
However, the historical discourse of nations lacks this modern, liberal idea of freedom. The concept of freedom discussed by previous civilizations and religions primarily referred to inner freedom and freedom from moral vices.
This understanding also applies in Islam, where freedom is inward and refers to liberation from the domination of the ego—not simply freedom in the political, social, or economic arenas. Hence, the very identity and essence of freedom in liberalism is materialistic, and social-political concepts like human rights and liberty are considered post-religious, to be defined through this lens.
There’s no clear evidence supporting the assumption that human rights—including the right to freedom—are historically rooted only in liberalism. In fact, the clear and evident teachings of great Abrahamic religions like Christianity and Judaism—as cited in the Qur’an—and of Islam itself, prove the falsity of this notion. If we overlook the superficiality of some liberal definitions, another critical flaw emerges: excessiveness. These definitions equate freedom with absolute release from obligations related to divine and moral responsibilities.
1. Freedom is defined without boundaries except for civil laws.
2. Since these laws are inspired by liberalism and secularism, they are founded on material benefits and utilitarian ethics. They often take a neutral—or even hostile—stance toward religion, including its most fundamental teachings. These laws consider religion a private matter, separate from societal interests, and do not provide any guidance or policy to enforce even the most basic religious practices. They recognize individual choices—even idolatry and superstition—as valid.
This excessive openness is evident in liberal human rights frameworks, particularly in Articles 16, 18, and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which explicitly declare: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change one’s religion or belief…”
However, this liberal openness toward religious freedom—especially concerning Islam—is only upheld as long as religious beliefs remain private and do not influence behavior or public action. Once faith translates into public conduct, secular laws impose restrictions, and freedom is again restrained.
A recent example is seen in France’s legal and judicial stance on the hijab, which starkly exposes the contradictions and double standards within Western legal systems and the liberal view of freedom.
Continues…
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