Inquiries on the Science of the Objectives of Sharia (Part 23)
1. The Authority of Relevance
Relevance is one of the most important methods for establishing the criterion; however, there are differences of opinion regarding its authority.
Some Hanafi scholars contend that while relevance is appropriate for suspicion, it should not be equated with assumption or conjecture, which do not require a person to have the truth. It is inaccurate to assert that certain types of suspicions and conjectures—such as relevance and solitary reports—have value in Sharia, which would allow rulings to be made based upon them. This is because suspicion and conjecture hold value in Sharia only when supported by definitive proof indicating their validity; thus, we must set aside any relevance arising from unsubstantiated suspicion.
In contrast, some Shafei scholars consider this method to hold value, as they deem the adherence to any type of more correct suspicion necessary within Sharia. Alongside the consensus of certain Sahaba acting on suspicion, they see this as evidence for its validity.
The result of these discussions is as follows: First, the validity of relevance is contested among Sunnis, which contradicts the claim of consensus on the validity of this method made by Muhammad Shafei. Even among Shafei scholars, the perceived value of this method is disputed. If general evidence seems to confirm the compatibility or usefulness of certainty, then that certainty is indeed evidence, similar to cases where we ascertain compatibility between the ruling and the subject matter. Second, if we understand this compatibility as the alignment of the description with the ruling from a rational perspective, then the verdict from definitive intellect also serves as proof. Third, if we view relevance merely as the conjunction and compatibility of the description with the ruling, the result is suspicion and conjecture, which are evidently deemed worthless.
E: Shabah Analogy (Similarity)
1. Meaning of Shabah (Similarity):
Shabah linguistically means resemblance or similarity, with its plural forms including Moshabeh, Ishbah, and Mushabih. In Usuli terminology, Shabah is a subject of dispute; both Juwayni and Shafe’i maintained that similarity is not clearly definable.
Some Hanbali Usuli scholars argue that if two causes or principles converge in a particular case, the jurist should assess the similarities of the case to associate it with one of the two principles. They will attach the branch to the principle that exhibits more similarities to it. For example, determining the blood price for a servant or slave who has been accidentally killed involves two principles:
1. In cases of wrongful killing, the killer is obliged to pay the blood money. A slave, being human, is comparable to a free person in this regard.
2. Regarding property damage, the individual responsible must pay for the destroyed item based on its value at the time of destruction, considering that a slave is treated as the property of the owner; thus, the killer must compensate based on the slave’s value at that time.
It is noteworthy that there are differing opinions here. The majority of Sunnis regard a person’s freedom as the foundational principle of human existence and view slavery as a supplementary burden. They therefore consider the first principle to be stronger and have ruled that it requires the payment of blood money (i.e., the same as that for a free individual) via the analogy of similarity.
Both Muhammad ibn Idris Shafe’i and Amadi have argued that similarity should not be viewed as a means for identifying the cause. Instead, they interpret it as a similarity stemming from precision in associating the branch with the principle. For example, according to the noble verse: «فَجَزَاء مِّثْلُ مَا قَتَلَ مِنَ النَّعَمِ.» (“Then the punishment is the like of what he killed of the good.”), a punishment must be paid similar to what was killed. The atonement required for hunting within the sanctuary must equate to that of the hunted itself. Any animal hunted in the sanctuary can be substituted with an equivalent amount of meat from lawful animals or its monetary value as atonement. If a lawful animal is chosen that shares more characteristics with the hunted animal, then the same quantity of that animal must be given as atonement rather than its price.
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and others have interpreted the addition of a derivative to the original as a form of similarity; however, they argue that a shared characteristic cannot serve as a valid criterion for making rulings. For instance, adding tayammum (dry ablution) to wudu (ritual washing) to validate that intention is obligatory based on the shared property of purity should not be taken as similarity. Purity cannot itself constitute the cause of the obligation of intention; while both processes result in cleanliness, only purity from certain impurities does require intention, as it is classified as an act of worship.
2. Validity of Similarity:
If the method for recognizing or identifying the criterion for the ruling hinges solely on the method of similarity, various opinions exist regarding its validity:
Qadi Abu Bakr Baqlani, Abu Mansur, Abu Ishaq Marozi, Qadi Abdul Wahhab, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal have all rejected similarity as demonstrable and do not recognize this method as one for identifying the cause. Consequently, comparisons based on this approach are deemed worthless; since similarity offers no robust evidence to discover or substantiate a common cause, it is improper to base rulings upon it. Such a comparison is seen as leading to an “illusion of relevance,” and thus the general applicability of the ruling lacks a solid foundation.
Conversely, some Maleki and Shafe’i scholars affirm the validity of similarity and advocate that in matters of religion, one should operate according to suspicion; they also regard this description as useful for suspicion.
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali regarded the description of similarity as valid proof for the mujtahid; however, he argued that the mujtahid cannot present it as proof in arguments for others.
Ultimately, the researcher concludes that the description of similarity cannot be considered a valid proof for identifying or recognizing the cause; this is due to two primary reasons: first, it leads to illusion for the mujtahid and fails to reveal any common cause; second, proponents of this method have not provided any convincing proof for its validity.
The consensus among Sunni scholars remains that as long as the analogy of the cause is feasible, there is no justification for relying on the analogy of similarity, despite some having employed this approach in various areas of jurisprudence.