Author: Mawlawi Abdullah Azzam
Imam al-A’zam Abu Hanifah (RA): The Role Model (part 18)
Collection of Articles
The Virtues of Imam Abu Hanifah (RA)
The Hanafi Consultative System in the Codification of the Shari’ah and Its Method of Deliberation
Within the Hanafi consultative council, every legal issue was subjected to thorough and rigorous examination. No ruling was regarded as fit for implementation until it had undergone comprehensive investigation and careful scholarly scrutiny.
Whenever a legal question was presented, Imam Abu Hanifah (RA) sought the opinion of every member of the council. If all members reached unanimous agreement, Imam Abu Yusuf (RA) would record the ruling clearly in the books of legal principles. However, if differences of opinion arose, open discussion and scholarly debate would continue freely. In some cases, deliberation over a single issue lasted for months until every aspect had been thoroughly examined. Only after a matter had been fully clarified and settled was it committed to writing.
Muwaffaq ibn Ahmad al-Makki writes in Manaqib Abi Hanifah: «فَكَانَ يُلْقِي مَسْأَلَةً مَسْأَلَةً وَيَسْمَعُ مَا عِنْدَهُمْ وَيَقُولُ مَا عِنْدَهُ وَيُنَاظِرُهُمْ شَهْرًا أَوْ أَكْثَرَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ حَتَّى يَسْتَقِرَّ أَحَدُ الْأَقْوَالِ ثُمَّ يُثْبِتُهَا أَبُو يُوسُفَ فِي الْأُصُولِ.» (Manāqib Abi Hanifah, vol. 2, p. 313). Translation: Imam Abu Hanifah would present legal questions one by one, listen to the opinions of the council members, and then express his own view. They would continue debating a single issue for a month or even longer until one opinion was unanimously accepted. Thereafter, Abu Yusuf would record it in the books of legal principles.
Likewise, Allamah al-Kardari writes in Manaqib al-Kardari: «إِذَا وَقَعَتْ لَهُمْ مَسْأَلَةٌ يُدِيرُونَهَا حَتَّى يُضِيئُوهَا.» (Manaqib al-Kardarī, vol. 2, p. 3). Translation: Whenever a legal issue was brought before the Imam’s council, they continued discussing and examining it until every aspect became completely clear and illuminated.
The renowned Hadith scholar Imam al-Aʿmash (RA) also testified to this remarkable method. When someone asked him about a legal issue, he pointed to the circle of Imam Abu Hanifah and his students and said, «عَلَيْكَ بِأَهْلِ تِلْكَ الْحَلْقَةِ فَإِنَّهُمْ إِذَا وَقَعَتْ لَهُمْ مَسْأَلَةٌ لَا يَزَالُونَ يُدِيرُونَهَا.» (Muʿjam al-Muṣannifīn, vol. 2, p. 184). Translation: Join that circle, for whenever they encounter a legal issue, they examine and analyze it with great care until it is thoroughly understood.
Within this juristic council, every member’s opinion was treated with respect and given serious consideration. Until the views of all members had been heard and carefully evaluated in light of the available evidence, Imam Abu Hanifah would not permit a ruling to be formally recorded.
Husn al-Taqadi fi Sirat Abi Yusuf al-Qaḍi narrates through an authentic chain from Isḥāq ibn Ibrāhīm that the companions of Imam Abu Hanifah would engage in extensive research and discussion in his presence. If Yazid ibn ʿAfiyah happened to be absent, the Imam would instruct them not to finalize the issue until he had arrived.
«فَإِذَا حَضَرَ عَافِيَةُ وَوَافَقَهُمْ قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ: اكْتُبُوهَا، وَإِنْ لَمْ يُوَافِقْهُمْ قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ: لَا تَكْتُبُوهَا.» (Ḥusn al-Taqāḍī, p. 12). Translation: When Yazid ibn ʿAfiyah arrived and agreed with the other members, Abu Hanifah instructed them, “Record it.” But if he disagreed, he would say, “Do not record it.”
Imam Abu Hanifah did not approve of codifying Islamic law solely on the basis of his own opinion unless every aspect of the issue had first been carefully examined and fully discussed by the consultative council.
For this reason, whenever Imam Abu Yusuf recorded some of his teacher’s legal opinions before they had undergone sufficient review, the imam would admonish him, saying, «لَا تَكْتُبْ كُلَّ مَا تَسْمَعُ مِنِّي، فَإِنِّي قَدْ أَرَى الرَّأْيَ الْيَوْمَ وَأَتْرُكُهُ غَدًا، وَأَرَى الرَّأْيَ غَدًا وَأَتْرُكُهُ فِي غَدِهِ.» (Naṣb al-Rāyah, p. 310; Tārīkh Baghdād, vol. 13, p. 424). Translation: Do not write down everything you hear from me, for today I may hold one opinion and abandon it tomorrow; tomorrow I may adopt another opinion and leave it the following day.
He adopted this approach so that the opinions of the senior jurists and leading members of the council would also be considered. Before obtaining their views and conducting comprehensive research and meticulous legal analysis, he neither imposed his own opinion nor approved of relying solely upon his personal judgment.
Even after a legal issue had passed through every stage of scholarly investigation, its textual and rational proofs had been assembled, and consensus had been reached among the council members, Imam Abu Hanifah still did not insist that his own opinion was beyond challenge. Rather, he would humbly declare: «هَذَا رَأْيٌ حَسَنٌ وَهُوَ أَحْسَنُ مَا قَدَرْنَا عَلَيْهِ، فَمَنْ جَاءَ بِأَحْسَنَ مِمَّا قُلْنَا فَهُوَ أَوْلَى بِالصَّوَابِ مِنَّا.» (Al-Jawāhir al-Muḍiyyah, p. 590). Translation: This is a sound opinion, and it is the best conclusion we have been able to reach. However, if someone presents a better argument supported by stronger evidence, then his opinion is more deserving of acceptance and is closer to the truth than ours.
Whenever an issue was brought before the council, every member was given complete freedom to critique and examine it. Each scholar had the opportunity to present observations and objections based on the Qur’an, Sunnah, Athar (reports from the early generations), Ijmaʿ (scholarly consensus), and Qiyas (analogical reasoning).
Imam Abu Hanifah deliberately cultivated an atmosphere of purposeful consultation, open debate, and sincere scholarly discussion. He wanted the council to remain free from unnecessary formality so that respect between teacher and student would never inhibit honest inquiry or prevent the thorough examination of legal questions. His objective was to ensure that no weakness or deficiency remained in the formulation of Islamic law.
Every member was encouraged to present his evidence openly while the Imam listened with remarkable patience and broad-mindedness. At times, discussions became so animated that members of the council would raise their voices and openly disagree with him, even saying directly, “Your evidence on this point is mistaken.”
Allamah al-Jurjani (RA) relates: I attended one of these gatherings and was astonished. I looked around and asked those present, “Is this how you show respect to your teacher?” Then I said to Imam Abu Hanifah, “Why do you allow such boldness and argumentation?”
The Imam replied: «دَعْهُمْ، فَإِنِّي قَدْ عَوَّدْتُهُمْ ذَلِكَ مَعَ نَفْسِي.» (Al-Khayrāt al-Ḥisān, p. 110). Translation: Leave them alone, for I myself have accustomed them to this freedom. I want them never to feel intimidated in this gathering. I have granted every one of them the right to challenge even my own evidence so that the truth may be refined and every aspect of the matter fully clarified.
This method of scholarly deliberation gained widespread admiration among the people. Before Imam Abu Hanifah, even the leading scholars among the Tabiʿun had not generally examined legal questions with such depth or explored their various dimensions so comprehensively.
Muwaffaq al-Makki writes: The scholars and jurists of Kūfah greatly admired Imam Abu Hanifah’s remarkable method of legislation and legal problem-solving. (Al-Manāqib, vol. 1, p. 54).
The Number of Legal Rulings
Imam Abu Hanifah assumed the teaching position of his mentor Imam Ḥammād in 120 AH and passed away in 150 AH. During these thirty years, he derived, compiled, and systematically organized an enormous body of Islamic legal rulings.
Some scholars estimate that the number of issues addressed reached 1.2 million. However, Shams al-Aʾimmah al-Kardari states that the number was approximately 600,000, a figure also transmitted by Muwaffaq ibn Aḥmad al-Makki, who notes that the classical books of Hanafi jurisprudence support this estimate. (Difāʿ Imam Abi Hanifah, citing Jāmiʿ al-Masanid, p. 136; Fatawa Rahimiyyah, vol. 1, p. 136; Sīrat al-Nuʿmān, p. 154).
The Acceptance and Distinctive Features of Hanafi Jurisprudence
Allah Almighty granted this monumental scholarly endeavor—undertaken with complete sincerity—universal acceptance. Its reputation spread throughout the Islamic world. The compiled works of Hanafi jurisprudence were adopted by courts and government institutions, and Muslim rulers issued them to judges as official legal manuals.
Yahya ibn Adam states, «قَضَى بِهِ الْخُلَفَاءُ وَالْأَئِمَّةُ وَالْحُكَّامُ وَاسْتَقَرَّ عَلَيْهِ الْأَمْرُ.» (Al-Manāqib, vol. 2, p. 47). Translation: The caliphs, rulers, and judges administered justice according to the jurisprudence compiled by Imam Abu Hanifah, and this became the established legal practice.
The distinguishing characteristics of the Hanafi school and the reasons for its broad acceptance have been described in numerous classical works. Tashil al-Ḥaqāʾiq mentions, among others, the following:
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The rulings of Hanafi jurisprudence are founded upon wisdom (ḥikmah) and public welfare (maṣlaḥah), while remaining firmly grounded in both transmitted evidence (riwāyah) and sound legal reasoning (dirāyah).
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Compared with other schools of Islamic law, the practical application of Hanafi jurisprudence is generally more accessible and accommodating.
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In the field of commercial transactions (muʿāmalāt), the Hanafi school exhibits exceptional breadth, precision, and legal sophistication, making it particularly well suited to the needs of human civilization.
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The school recognizes and safeguards extensive legal rights for non-Muslim subjects (dhimmīs), thereby facilitating effective governance and social stability within Islamic states.
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In matters explicitly established by textual evidence (naṣṣ), the legal positions adopted by Imam Abu Hanifah are generally supported by strong and well-substantiated proofs.
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During the reign of Caliph Haroon al-Rashed, Imam Abu Yusuf was appointed Chief Judge (Qāḍī al-Quḍāt). He administered justice according to Hanafi jurisprudence throughout Iraq, Khurāsān, Transoxiana (Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr), and many other regions. This official adoption greatly contributed to the widespread recognition and expansion of the Hanafi school—a distinction unmatched by the legal school of any other individual jurist. (Tashil al-Haqaʾiq, p. 8).
To be continued…
