Author: Mawlawi Abdullah Azzam
Imam al-A’zam Abu Hanifah (RA): The Role Model (part 17)
Collection of Articles
The Virtues of Imam Abu Hanifah (RA)
Why Did Imam Abu Hanifah Feel the Need to Systematize Islamic Law?
There is no doubt that the first pioneering effort in the systematic compilation and classification of the sciences of the Sharīʿah was undertaken by Imam Abu Hanifah (RA). As Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyuti (RA) writes in his book Tabyid al-Sahifah: «مِنْ مَنَاقِبِ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ الَّتِي انْفَرَدَ بِهَا أَنَّهُ أَوَّلُ مَنْ دَوَّنَ عِلْمَ الشَّرِيعَةِ وَرَتَّبَهُ أَبْوَابًا، ثُمَّ تَابَعَهُ مَالِكُ بْنُ أَنَسٍ فِي تَرْتِيبِ الْمُوَطَّأِ، وَلَمْ يَسْبِقْ أَبَا حَنِيفَةَ أَحَدٌ.» Translation: Among the unique virtues of Abu Hanifah is that he was the first to compile the sciences of the Sharīʿah and arrange them into systematic chapters. Thereafter, Malek ibn Anas followed his example in organizing the Al-Muwatta. No one preceded Abu Hanifah in undertaking this work.
As to why Imam Abu Hanifah (RA) considered it necessary to compile and systematically organize Islamic jurisprudence, perhaps the most comprehensive explanation was given by the distinguished Muslim scholar and renowned Islamic thinker Mawlana Abu al-Hasan ʿAlī al-Nadawi (RA). In his book Social Ijtihad, he writes:
The emergence of the great Imams and independent jurists during the earliest centuries of Islam stands as evidence of the vitality of this religion and the intellectual strength of the Muslim Ummah. Through their scholarly efforts, order and unity were established in the practical and legal affairs of Muslim society, saving the Ummah from the intellectual fragmentation and social disorder that afflicted many other nations of their time.
Had the early scholars neglected the task of legal reasoning (Ijtihad) and the deduction and extraction of Islamic rulings, the governments of that era—driven by the practical necessities of governing expanding Muslim territories—would have been compelled to impose Roman or Persian legal systems upon the Islamic world. Muslims were confronting entirely new circumstances and unprecedented issues. Questions concerning commerce, agriculture, jizyah, kharāj, the legal status of prisoners, and the administrative challenges arising in newly conquered lands all required authoritative Islamic rulings. Ancient customs and emerging realities alike demanded guidance from Islamic law.
These were unavoidable necessities of life. Every government required a comprehensive and detailed legal code. Had the formulation of Islamic law been delayed, the adoption of Roman or Persian legislation would have become inevitable. Even a slight negligence on the part of Muslim scholars could have deprived this Ummah for centuries of the blessings of an Islamic social order and its divinely guided legal system.
There was also an urgent need to clarify the rulings concerning acts of worship so that issues arising from forgetfulness, human error, inadvertence, or unfamiliarity with Islamic teachings could be properly resolved. Likewise, the legal questions of those newly embracing Islam required clear answers. The detailed rulings governing Salah (prayer), Sawm (fasting), Zakah, Ḥajj, and other acts of worship and social transactions needed to be carefully researched and documented in the light of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Recognizing these pressing needs and practical realities, Imam Abu Hanifah (RA) regarded the systematic compilation and classification of Islamic jurisprudence as an urgent necessity that could no longer be postponed. To accomplish this monumental task, he established an academic council of Ijtihad and Fiqh, bringing together leading scholars and specialists from the various Islamic sciences of his time to deliberate collectively on legal issues and formulate well-founded juristic rulings.
The Academy for the Compilation of the Sharīʿah and the Distinctive Qualities of Its Members
Although Imam Abu Hanifah (RA) was a leading authority in Hadith, a master jurist (faqīh), and unmatched in the field of ijtihad (independent legal reasoning), he did not consider it appropriate to undertake the compilation of the Sharīʿah and the deduction of legal rulings on his own. Unlike many other jurists who practiced ijtihad individually, he adopted the consultative (shūrā) method of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (RA). From among his students, he carefully selected outstanding scholars who, in addition to their mastery of Hadith and jurisprudence, had attained remarkable levels of piety, devotion, and righteousness through their close companionship with their teacher.
He established a council of Ijtihad, dedicated to legal deduction, analysis, and the systematic development of Islamic jurisprudence. This scholarly body was distinguished by its exceptional atmosphere of intellectual freedom, open discussion, and unrestricted expression of scholarly opinion.
This is one of the defining characteristics of Hanafi jurisprudence. It is not merely the product of the opinions of a single jurist, but rather the outcome of many years of collaborative effort by a distinguished body of eminent jurists and scholars. As Allamah al-Qurashi (RA) writes in Al-Jawāhir al-Muḍiyyah: فَوَضَعَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ مَذْهَبَهُ شُورَى بَيْنَهُمْ، لَمْ يَسْتَبِدَّ فِيهِ بِنَفْسِهِ دُونَهُمْ. Translation: Abu Hanifah established his school upon consultation (shura) and did not confine the development of its jurisprudence to his own personal reasoning alone.
The specialists whom Imam Abu Hanifah required for legal reasoning, the compilation of jurisprudence, and legislative deliberation were all members of this forty-member scholarly academy.
Mawlana ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Farangī Maḥallī (RA) describes the scholarly excellence of these members by stating that they were among the foremost mujtahids of their age:
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Qadi Abu Yūsuf excelled in the sciences of Hadith and the Arabic language.
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Imam Muḥammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybānī was unrivaled in Fiqh, Arabic grammar (Naḥw), and rhetoric (Balāghah).
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Imam Zufar ibn al-Hudhayl was renowned for his expertise in Qiyās (analogical reasoning).
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Hasan ibn Ziyād was unmatched in deriving and expanding subsidiary legal rulings.
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ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Mubārak was famous for the soundness and strength of his legal judgment.
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Ḥafṣ ibn Ghiyāth earned distinction for his judicial excellence and fairness in adjudicating disputes.
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Zakariyyā ibn Abī Zāʾidah was unparalleled in collecting prophetic traditions and preserving the detailed branches of jurisprudence.
Considering the comprehensive nature of this scholarly council and the presence of leading experts in every branch of Islamic learning, Imam Wakīʿ ibn al-Jarrāḥ (RA) once replied to someone who claimed that Imam Abu Hanifah had erred on a particular issue: “أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ كَيْفَ يُخْطِئُ، وَعِنْدَهُ مِثْلُ أَبِي يُوسُفَ وَزُفَرَ فِي الْقِيَاسِ، وَيَحْيَى بْنِ أَبِي زَائِدَةَ وَحَفْصِ بْنِ غِيَاثٍ وَحَبَّانَ وَمِنْدَلٍ فِي الْحَدِيثِ، وَقَاسِمِ بْنِ مَعْنٍ فِي اللُّغَةِ، وَدَاوُدَ الطَّائِيِّ وَالْفُضَيْلِ بْنِ عِيَاضٍ فِي الزُّهْدِ وَالْوَرَعِ?” He then added: “مَنْ كَانَ هَؤُلَاءِ جُلَسَاءَهُ لَمْ يَكُنْ يُخْطِئُ، لِأَنَّهُ إِنْ أَخْطَأَ رَدُّوهُ.” (Akhbar Abi Hanifah wa Ashabih, pp. 158–159).
Translation: How could Abu Hanifah make mistakes while scholars such as Abu Yūsuf and Zufar were with him in matters of analogical reasoning; eminent Hadith scholars such as Yaḥya ibn Abi Zaʾidah, Hafṣ ibn Ghiyāth, Habbān, and Mandal were by his side; distinguished linguists such as Qāsim ibn Maʿn were present; and ascetics and men of piety such as Dawud al-Taʾi and al-Fudail ibn Iyad were among his companions? Whoever is surrounded by such companions is unlikely to err, for if he does, they will certainly correct him.
Muʿjam al-Muṣannifīn records that Imam Abu Hanifah himself addressed the members of this juristic academy and council of legal codification, saying, “Each one of you forty scholars is fully qualified to serve as a judge (Qadi), and among you are ten individuals who are qualified not only to be judges themselves but also to teach and train judges.” (Muʿjam al-Muṣannifīn, vol. 2, p. 55).
The Principles of Ijtihad in the Hanafi School for the Compilation of the Sharīʿah
The principles that Imam Abu Hanifah (RA) established for legal reasoning and the deduction of rulings within this scholarly academy have been transmitted through reliable chains of narration in the classical works of Islamic history, biography, and scholarly literature.
These principles were not innovations devised by Imam Abu Hanifah himself. Rather, he followed the well-known prophetic tradition in which the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) instructed Muʿādh ibn Jabal (may Allah be pleased with him) regarding the proper methodology for resolving legal matters.
Among the fundamental principles of Imam Abu Hanifah was that if he found even a weak (ḍaʿīf) Hadith concerning a legal issue, he would set aside his own personal reasoning and analogical deduction (qiyās) and act upon that narration instead.
Likewise, in the deliberations of his Council of Ijtihad, he adopted the same methodology practiced by the noble Companions (may Allah be pleased with them all). He gave particular weight to the legal judgments and opinions of ʿAbdullāh ibn Masʿūd, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Qadi Shurayḥ, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, Imam Ḥammād, and other eminent jurists and scholars of his era.
Certain false accusations have been directed against Imam Abu Hanifah, claiming that he allegedly gave preference to his personal opinion and analogical reasoning over the authentic traditions of the Prophet (PBUH). Numerous classical and later scholars refuted these allegations and authored independent works defending the honor and scholarly integrity of the Imam.
Among the most notable of these is the work of ʿAllamah Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (RA), entitled «تَأْنِيبُ الْخَطِيبِ عَلَى مَا سَاقَهُ فِي تَرْجَمَةِ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ مِنَ الْأَكَاذِيبِ» In this book, al-Kawtharī presents a comprehensive refutation of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, demonstrating that the reports he transmitted against Imam Abu Hanifah were unfounded and should not be accepted.
The Principles of Consultation and Legal Methodology in the School of Imam Abu Hanifah
Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr in Al-Intiqāʾ and Allamah al-Ṣāliḥī al-Dimashqī in ʿUqūd al-Jumān narrate the following statement from Imam Abu Hanifah (RA) concerning the consultative principles and methodology of legal deduction adopted by his council: «إِذَا جَاءَنَا الْحَدِيثُ عَنْ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ (PBUH) أَخَذْنَا بِهِ، وَإِذَا جَاءَنَا عَنِ الصَّحَابَةِ تَخَيَّرْنَا، وَإِذَا جَاءَنَا عَنِ التَّابِعِينَ زَاحَمْنَاهُمْ.» (Al-Intiqāʾ, p. 266; ʿUqūd al-Jumān, p. 143). Translation: Whenever an authentic narration from the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) reaches us, we accept it and act upon it. When reports from the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) reach us, we choose from among their opinions. When it comes to the views of the Tabiʿun (the Successors), we engage with them through scholarly reasoning and legal analysis.
Accordingly, the Qur’an was always the first and foremost source consulted in resolving legal questions. The Sunnah—the Prophetic traditions—constituted the second principal source upon which Imam Abu Hanifah built his consultative system of jurisprudence.
He resorted to Qiyās (analogical reasoning) only when no explicit evidence could be found in the primary sources. As Allamah ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī in Al-Mīzān and Dr. Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī in Al-Sunnah wa Makānatuhā fī al-Tashrīʿ al-Islāmī relate, Imam Abu Hanifah said, «نَحْنُ لَا نَقِيسُ إِلَّا عِنْدَ الضَّرُورَةِ الشَّدِيدَةِ، وَذَلِكَ أَنَّا نَنْظُرُ أَوَّلًا فِي دَلِيلِ تِلْكَ الْمَسْأَلَةِ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَالسُّنَّةِ أَوْ أَقْضِيَةِ الصَّحَابَةِ، فَإِنِ اخْتَلَفُوا قِسْنَا حُكْمًا عَلَى حُكْمٍ بِجَامِعِ الْعِلَّةِ بَيْنَ الْمَسْأَلَتَيْنِ حَتَّى يَتَّضِحَ الْمَعْنَى.» (Al-Mīzān, vol. 1, p. 224). Translation: We employ analogical reasoning only in cases of genuine necessity. We first search for evidence regarding the issue in the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH), and the judgments of the Companions. If the relevant reports differ, we then compare one ruling with another on the basis of their common effective cause (ʿillah) until the correct legal meaning becomes clear.
If a legal question could not be satisfactorily resolved through Qiyās, Imam Abu Hanifah would then resort to Istiḥsān (juristic preference). Nevertheless, the textual evidence of the Qur’an and the Sunnah always remained supreme and took precedence over every other source.
As Qadi Abu Yūsuf (RA) is reported to have said in Al-Jawāhir al-Muḍiyyah: «كَانَ إِذَا وَرَدَتْ حَادِثَةٌ قَالَ: هَلْ عِنْدَكُمْ أَثَرٌ؟ فَإِنْ كَانَ عِنْدَهُ أَوْ عِنْدَنَا أَثَرٌ أَخَذَ بِهِ، وَإِنِ اخْتَلَفَتِ الْآثَارُ أَخَذَ بِالْأَكْثَرِ، وَإِلَّا أَخَذَ بِالْقِيَاسِ، وَإِنْ تَعَسَّرَ الْقِيَاسُ تَرَكَهُ إِلَى الِاسْتِحْسَانِ.» (Al-Jawāhir al-Muḍiyyah, p. 590). Translation: Whenever a new legal issue arose, the Imam would ask, “Do you have any transmitted report concerning this matter?” If either he or we possessed a relevant report, he would act upon it. If there were multiple reports with differing implications, he would follow the one supported by the greater number of narrations. If no suitable report existed, he would resort to analogical reasoning; and if analogy did not provide a satisfactory solution, he would adopt juristic preference (istiḥsān).
Al-Fudail ibn Iyad (RA), who himself was a member of this scholarly council, stated: «إِنْ كَانَ فِي الْمَسْأَلَةِ حَدِيثٌ تَبِعَهُ، وَإِنْ كَانَ عَنْ الصَّحَابَةِ أَوِ التَّابِعِينَ فَكَذَلِكَ، وَإِلَّا قَاسَ فَأَحْسَنَ الْقِيَاسَ.» (Referenced in the cited source, vol. 2, p. 147).
Translation: If there was a Prophetic Hadith concerning a legal issue, he followed it. If there was a statement from the Companions or the Successors, he likewise gave it due consideration. If none of these existed, he applied analogical reasoning—and he did so in the finest possible manner.
This statement of al-Fudail ibn Iyad demonstrates that Imam Abu Hanifah neither rejected all the opinions of the Tabiʿun nor accepted them indiscriminately. Rather, he carefully considered their views and, where differences of opinion existed, subjected them to scholarly examination and legal analysis.
Within the Hanafi Academy of Jurisprudence and its distinguished consultative council established for the codification of Islamic law, the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the opinions of the noble Companions (may Allah be pleased with them all) always held the highest authority.
Anyone who studies the classical works of the Hanafi school with fairness and objectivity will recognize that the Hanafi madhhab—developed through the collective efforts of approximately forty eminent mujtahids—is firmly rooted in the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger (PBUH).
In Al-Mīzān, Allamah ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī writes: It is by the grace of Allah that I have studied the works of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence and even beyond them. In particular, I devoted great attention to examining the evidence of Imam Abu Hanifah (RA). I also carefully studied the authentication (takhrīj) of the Hadiths cited in Al-Hidāyah, undertaken by Allamah al-Zaylaʿī (RA). I found that the legal proofs of Imam Abu Hanifah and his companions are based upon authentic (Sahih), sound (Hasan), or weak (daʿīf) narrations that have been transmitted through three to ten independent chains of transmission. Owing to the multiplicity of these chains, such narrations attain the level of authenticity required for legal evidence and are elevated to the rank of Hasan or even Sahih Hadiths.
To be continued…
