Author: Ayoub Rasekh
Modern Atheism in the Balance of Critique (part 6)
Rationalism
Following the discussion of naturalism and its principal claims as foundational elements of New Atheism, this section examines rationalism as one of the most important philosophical foundations of contemporary atheism. What is meant by rationalism? And what do modern atheists intend by this term?
A close study of Western philosophers reveals that, despite its apparent clarity, rationalism has been used in different senses. Unless these meanings are distinguished and the intended usage clarified, misunderstanding is inevitable. Among the various meanings of rationalism, three are particularly prominent and require explanation for a clearer understanding of the subject.
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Rationalism as the Rejection of Empiricism
One important and common meaning of rationalism is its opposition to empiricism. In this sense, rationalism emphasizes intellectual knowledge over sensory and empirical knowledge. Rationalists maintain that reason is an independent and superior source of knowledge compared to sense perception.
Philosophers such as René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz understood rationalism in this way. [1]
From the rationalist perspective, although knowledge is not derived exclusively from reason, the only certain and foundational source of knowledge is reason itself. Compared to sensory and empirical knowledge, rational knowledge alone is fully reliable. [2]
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Rationalism as the Rejection of Tradition
In another usage, rationalism does not primarily oppose empiricism but rather emphasizes the exercise of human reason over inherited tradition. In the previous sense, rationalism stood in contrast to empiricism; here, however, it may incorporate empirical methods while opposing uncritical reliance on tradition.
This form of rationalism is commonly associated with philosophers of the Enlightenment. Thinkers such as Voltaire assigned greater value to human reason—encompassing empirical inquiry—than to tradition. According to this view, knowledge obtained through human reason is superior to knowledge derived merely from tradition or faith.
Thus, during the Enlightenment, rationalism was directed more against religion and inherited tradition than against empiricism. In this sense, rationalism affirms empirical investigation and utilizes it in pursuit of its aims. [3]
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Rationalism as the Rejection of Non-Rational Interpretations of Religion
With the flourishing of the Enlightenment in Europe—following significant scientific advancements—confidence in human intellectual capacity increased, and the idea of “rational critique” emerged. According to this approach, nothing lies beyond the scope of rational examination.
This dominant Enlightenment attitude affected all areas of thought, including religion. Christian theologians began reassessing their doctrines through the lens of critical reason, accepting only those teachings that could be rationally justified. The roots of this perspective are evident in the writings of Immanuel Kant, particularly where he maintains that religion must remain within the bounds of reason.
Historians of philosophy have also labeled this intra-religious approach as “rationalism.” However, it clearly differs from the earlier usages. While the second meaning of rationalism is a broad methodological principle requiring all matters to be evaluated by reason, this third meaning applies specifically to religious doctrines.
According to this view, fideism (faith independent of reason) is indefensible. Every religious claim must be subjected to rational scrutiny. [4]
It should be noted that rationalism in this context is divided into two forms:
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Maximal rationalism: No proposition is acceptable unless confirmed by reason.
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Minimal rationalism: Certain supra-rational religious propositions may not be provable by reason, although the foundations of religion themselves can be rationally justified. [5]
Continues…
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References:
[1] Parkinson, 1381 (2002): 11.
[2] Popkin, 1385 (2006): 288.
[3] Bayat, 1381 (2002): 386.
[4] Fouillée, 1370 (1991): 80.
[5] Peterson, 1387 (2008): 72–77.
